Herr Schleicher lässt uns wissen, dass eine Neuinterpretation der PISA-Daten von 2015 uns ermöglicht, einen Blick auf den Zusammenhang von Schulqualität und Lehrerausbildung zu werfen. Die folgenden Aussagen wurden der Einleitung und dem Executive Summary entnommen.
OECD. (2018). Effective Teacher Policies. Insights from PISA: OECD Publishing.
Ausgangspunkt: Die Postleitzahl der Schule sagt den Bildungserfolg voraus
Das ist etwas zugespitzt, aber es gilt leider immer noch, dass die soziale Lage einer Schule den späteren Schulerfolg maßgeblich bestimmt.
Achieving greater equity in education is not just a social justice imperative, it is also a way to use resources more efficiently, and to increase the supply of knowledge and skills that fuel social and economic development and cohesion.
Most education systems now recognise this challenge. The discourse in education policy has advanced considerably from equality (where the assumption was that all students benefit from the same support), to equity (where all students get the support they need), to justice (where all students succeed because inequities in opportunities have been redressed). And yet, successive PISA assessments have shown that, in most countries, a student’s or school’s postal code remains one of the best predictors of success in education. (OECD 2018, S. 3)
Die besten Lehrer müssten in die benachteiligtsten Schulen
Es gelingt nicht vielen Ländern, die besten Lehrer in die herausforderndsten Schulen zu bringen. Meisten haben die benachteiligten Schulen auch noch die am wenigsten qualifizierten und erfahrenen Lehrer. Das wirkt wesentlich stärker auf die Schulqualität als beispielsweise die Klassengröße.
PISA 2015 offers an important innovation by integrating a survey of teachers into the assessment; Effective Teacher Policies presents first findings from this survey. To some extent these findings are encouraging: more than half of the 69 countries and economies with comparable data now invest more teachers per student into disadvantaged than privileged schools. At the same time, few countries succeed in attracting the most qualified teachers to the most challenging schools. Quite the opposite, in fact: in most countries, teachers in disadvantaged schools are less-qualified and less-experienced, and principals feel that the lack of qualified teachers is a major barrier to overcome disadvantage and improve learning. This makes a big difference, because while the gap in academic achievement between advantaged and disadvantaged students seems unrelated to differences in class size, inequalities in outcomes are much larger in countries where teachers’ qualifications and experience are inequitably distributed. (OECD 2018, S. 3)
Wie machen das Japan und Korea?
In Japan müssen die Lehrer immer mal wieder turnusmäßig die Schule wechseln. In Korea werden hohe Maßstäbe an die Lehrer angelegt, dafür arbeiten sie auch unter guten Bedingungen. Auch hier müssen die Lehrer rotieren, sie wechseln alle fünf Jahre die Schule. Für die Arbeit an Schulen in schwierigen Lagen gibt es zusätzliche Anreize (Bezahlung, Stundenmaß, Aufstiegschancen).
In Japan, teachers are expected to periodically change schools throughout their career. This is intended to ensure that all schools have access to effective teachers and a balance of experienced and beginning teachers. The allocation of teachers to schools is decided by the local education authority, and the exact rules followed may differ.
In Korea, all teachers are held to high standards, which contributes to the country’s high levels of performance and equitable distribution of teachers. Other elements contributing to the high calibre of the teaching force are the highly respected status of teachers, job stability, high pay, and positive working conditions, including high levels of teacher collaboration. A mandatory rotation scheme for teachers in Korea means that teachers are required to move to a different school every five years. Within this scheme, multiple incentives are offered to attract teachers to high-needs schools, including additional salary, smaller classes, less instructional time, additional credit towards future promotion to administrative positions, and the ability to choose the next school where one works. The latter two career incentives are seen as particularly attractive. Source: OECD, 2005 (p. 159); OECD, 2012; Kang and Hong, 2008 . (OECD 2018, S. 34)
Mehr Eigenständigkeit der Schulen sorgt für bessere Bedingungen
Intuition might suggest that where the hiring of teachers is centrally managed, teacher allocation would end up being more equitable. But the data suggest otherwise. In those countries where schools have greater autonomy over the hiring of teachers and over establishing their salaries, the quality of teachers seems to be better aligned to meet the needs of students and schools.
That obviously doesn’t mean that increasing school autonomy will improve equity in teacher allocation. But it does suggest that school systems with an enabling and flexible work organisation that places considerable responsibility at the frontline also tend to be good at establishing conditions that better align resources with needs. (OECD 2018, S. 3–4)
Arme Kinder haben keine Lobby
Of course, that is all easier to say than to do. It will always be difficult for teachers to allocate scarce additional time and resources to the children with the greatest need. People who laud the value of diversity in classrooms are often talking about the classes other people’s children attend; it is hard to convince socio-economically advantaged parents whose children go to school with other privileged children that everyone is better off when classes are socially diverse. Policy makers, too, find it challenging to allocate resources where the challenges are greatest and where those resources can have the biggest impact, because poor children usually don’t have someone lobbying for them. (OECD 2018, S. 4)
Using data from the 2015 cycle of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and other related databases, this report shows that:
A variety of approaches to selecting and evaluating teachers, and a wide range of career and compensation structures for teachers, can be found across the best-performing countries in PISA. But at least three elements tend to be common to high-performing countries’ professional development policies for teachers: a mandatory and extended period of clinical practice as part of pre-service teacher education or of the induction period; the presence of a variety of bespoke opportunities for in-service teachers’ professional development, such as workshops organised by the school; and teacher-appraisal mechanisms with a strong focus on teachers’ continuous development.
On average across countries and economies that participated in PISA 2006 and PISA 2015, increases in school responsibility for selecting teachers for hire were associated with improvements in student achievement; reductions in school responsibility were associated with declining student achievement. However, the causal nature of this association cannot be determined.
In 2015, a majority of countries and economies that participated in PISA compensated disadvantaged schools with smaller classes and/or lower student-teacher ratios. However, in more than a third of countries and economies, teachers in the most disadvantaged schools were less qualified or less experienced than those in the most advantaged schools.
Gaps in student performance related to socio-economic status were wider in countries where socio-economically disadvantaged schools employed fewer qualified and experienced teachers than advantaged schools.
Greater school autonomy for managing teachers is associated with more equitable sorting of teachers across schools. (OECD 2018, S. 11–12)